Privity, Duty, and Loss: In \u3ci\u3eSwanson v. Ptak\u3c/i\u3e, 268 Neb. 265, 682 N.W.2d 225 (2004), the Nebraska Supreme Court Again Endorses Privity in Legal Malpractice Actions by Mason, Tracy M.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 84 | Issue 1 Article 7
2005
Privity, Duty, and Loss: In Swanson v. Ptak, 268 Neb.
265, 682 N.W.2d 225 (2004), the Nebraska
Supreme Court Again Endorses Privity in Legal
Malpractice Actions
Tracy M. Mason
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Tracy M. Mason, Privity, Duty, and Loss: In Swanson v. Ptak, 268 Neb. 265, 682 N.W.2d 225 (2004), the Nebraska Supreme Court Again
Endorses Privity in Legal Malpractice Actions, 84 Neb. L. Rev. (2005)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol84/iss1/7
Note*
Privity, Duty, and Loss: In Swanson
v. Ptak, 268 Neb. 265, 682 N.W.2d
225 (2004), the Nebraska Supreme
Court Again Endorses Privity in
Legal Malpractice Actions
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................... 369
II. Privity in Context .............................. 373
A. The Origins of Strict Privity ........... ......... 374
B. The New Majority: States without a Strict Privity
Requirem ent ...................................... 378
C. Indirect Privity and the Kurtenbach Approach ..... 380
D. Professional Negligence in Nebraska ............... 382
III. Leota's Loss to Bear: The Facts of Swanson ........... 385
IV. Nebraska's Missed Opportunity ....................... 388
A. Privity as Proof of No Duty ........................ 389
B. Abrogation and an Alternative: The Kurtenbach
Approach ......................................... 390
C. The Myth of "Automatic Liability" ................. 391
D. Privity and Loss-Bearing .......................... 393
V . Conclusion ............................................ 395
I. INTRODUCTION
The threat of malpractice-that word attorneys dread-is consid-
ered by some to be a growing threat in the practice of wills and estates
law, where brothers, sisters, spouses, cousins, and friends battle each
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other for gifts of money or property from a decedent's estate. Profes-
sor Marvin Begleiter suggests that "[olne of the major developments
in the law over the last 40 years has ... been the number of lawsuits
against attorneys for malpractice in estate planning.", While many
legal tasks, such as the high number of formalities required in the
execution of a will, are intended to protect testamentary instruments
from changes that might frustrate a decedent's intent,2 they can be
minefields for even the most exacting attorneys. 3 The distribution of
property when a decedent fails to draft a will can also be taxing.
While heirs scramble to determine their shares under a state's intes-
tacy laws, attorneys may be required to exclude seemingly deserving
heirs such as stepchildren or in-laws from the division of property if
they do not take under the state's statutes. Heirs or friends who fail
to take a share-either because of an intestacy scheme that excludes
them or their exclusion from a will-may be disappointed by their
plight and seek revenge on an otherwise innocent attorney. Scholar
Jennifer Knauth has suggested that "the genesis of legal malpractice
claims lies in unfulfilled client expectations," 4 and this aphorism
seems particularly applicable to the unfulfilled expectations of these
so-called "disappointed beneficiar[ies]."5
However, while attorneys practicing in the wills and estates field
may dread the threat of a malpractice lawsuit, their fears are at least
partially unfounded. First, estate-related malpractice claims are but
a small portion of the malpractice claims filed in the United States.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") recently reported that only
nine percent of malpractice claims from 1996 to 1999 arose in the ar-
eas of estates, trusts, and probate. 6 Compare this figure to malprac-
1. Martin D. Begleiter, The Gambler Breaks Even: Legal Malpractice in Compli-
cated Estate Planning Cases, 20 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 277, 277 (2003); see also John
Teshima, What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to
Person Other than Immediate Client, 61 A.L.R. 4th 464 § 2 (Westlaw 2004) (ob-
serving that there have recently been "a greater number of cases being brought
on theories of attorneys' liability to third parties for malpractice").
2. In re Snide, 418 N.E.2d 656, 658 (N.Y. 1981) (Jones, J., dissenting) (observing
that laws like the Statute of Wills were "designed for the protection of testators,
particularly against fraudulent changes in or additions to wills").
3. David K. Johns, Will Execution Ceremonies: Securing a Client's Last Wishes, 23
COLO. LAW. 47, 47 (1994) (observing that "[a]ttorneys often spend hours creating
complex estate plans for clients, only to potentially sabotage the validity of final
documents through improper execution"). For a historical and procedural look at
the will execution ceremony, see Gerry W. Beyer, The Will Execution Ceremony-
History, Significance, and Strategies, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 413 (1988).
4. Jennifer Knauth, Essay, Legal Malpractice: When the Legal System Turns on the
Lawyer, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 963, 967 (2004).
5. Ronald R. Volkmer, Attorney Liability to Nonclients: The Need to Re-Examine Ne-
braska's Privity Rule, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 295, 295 (1995).
6. AM. BAR AsS'N, STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROF. LIB., PROFILE OF LEGAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS, 1996-1999, at 7 (2001). Interestingly, fifty percent of es-
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tice claims arising from personal injury cases, which constitute
twenty-four percent of legal malpractice actions, and those arising
from real estate transactions, which constitute seventeen percent of
malpractice claims. 7 Further, in only approximately 2.2% of estate,
trust, and probate cases did a plaintiff win a judgment in court, while
sixty-nine percent abandoned their malpractice claims without pay-
ment.8 This is not to suggest that malpractice actions are not a fright-
ening, interruptive part of a professional law practice, but merely that
the "threat" of malpractice actions in the estates context may be
overrated.
Second, in Nebraska and a few other states across the nation,9 the
common law requires that the parties to a malpractice suit be in priv-
ity.lO In other words, they must be joined in a formal relationship,
typically signified by the presence of a contract. 1 Consequently, third
parties who are negatively affected by the negligent drafting or execu-
tion of a will-these are the "disappointed beneficiaries"-probably
have no claim against the attorney who drafted or executed the will
because they are not contractually linked to her.12 The only individu-
als who would be in privity are the attorney and her original client
who, in a typical wills and estates malpractice case, is already de-
ceased. 13 Thus, Nebraska attorneys are at least partially insulated
from plaintiff malpractice victories brought by a next-of-kin or other
potential beneficiaries. Nebraska scholar Ronald Volkmer, who in
1995 produced a thorough examination of Nebraska's privity require-
ment in attorney malpractice cases,14 asserts that the privity rule
gives Nebraska attorneys little liability-related incentive to more cau-
tiously draft or execute documents that make donative transfers.15
Volkmer concludes that they "have enjoyed 'virtual immunity' for neg-
ligent will drafting and other estate planning related activities."16
tate, trust and probate claims filed relate to title opinion errors, while 21.7% of
errors relate to the preparation of documents. Id. at 30.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 31.
9. See infra section II.B.
10. Landrigan v. Nelson, 227 Neb. 835, 836, 420 N.W.2d 313, 314 (1988).
11. See John Day Co. v. Alvine & Assocs., Inc., 1 Neb. App. 954, 959, 510 N.W.2d 462,
466 (1993) (observing that "[iln the absence of an otherwise binding agreement
... there is no privity of contract").
12. One court has aptly named this group "non-client beneficiar[ies]." Blair v. Ing, 21
P.3d 452, 458 (Haw. 2001).
13. Bradley E.S. Fogel, Attorney v. Client: Privity, Malpractice and the Lack of Re-
spect for the Primacy of the Attorney-Client Relationship in Estate Planning, 68
TENN. L. REV. 261, 267 (2001).
14. See Volkmer, supra note 5.




In 2004, the Nebraska Supreme Court again endorsed the privity
requirement for attorney malpractice cases, although on a set of unu-
sual facts.17 In 1997, Nebraska resident Wilma Pritchard died intes-
tate, effectively excluding her niece-in-law, Leota Swanson, from an
inheritance under Nebraska's intestacy laws.' 8 David Ptak, Pritch-
ard's attorney and later her estate's personal representative, at-
tempted to procure from the rightful heirs an inheritance for
Swanson, bargaining with Pritchard's siblings to provide Swanson
with approximately one-fourth of Pritchard's estate. 19 After giving
Swanson a check for $99,000-an early partial distribution to assist
her with the purchase of a condominium-the heirs decided not to
share the estate. 20 Ptak was forced to file suit against Swanson on
the estate's behalf to recover the funds, and Swanson filed suit against
Ptak alleging, among other things, professional negligence in his fail-
ure to obtain the remainder of her share in the estate. 2 1 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court rejected Swanson's claims, holding that
Swanson and Ptak were not in privity as required under Nebraska
law to sustain a claim of professional negligence. 22 Put simply, "Ptak
had no professional duty to secure a gratuitous agreement from
[Prichard's] heirs for the benefit of Swanson."23
In the typical estate planning malpractice case, it is the disap-
pointed beneficiary who seeks access to funds in an estate that she
feels she was denied. However, in Swanson, the court was asked
whether a non-beneficiary to a decedent's estate could recover dam-
ages from a personal representative who gave her a portion of the es-
tate and then took it back. The court determined that Ptak only had
duties to himself, as an attorney, and to the estate, as a personal rep-
resentative. Thus, despite Swanson's seemingly obvious reliance, the
court held that Ptak owed no duty to her.
A court that bases an attorney's liability on a privity requirement
in this manner views the contractual relationship as the fountainhead
of the attorney's duty to the client (or, as it were, lack of duty to the
non-client). If the attorney and third party are not bound by a contrac-
tual relationship, the attorney is held to have had no legal duty to her.
A lack of privity thus precludes discussion of whether a duty existed.
And, because no duty can exist outside the contract, the privity re-
quirement effectively bars an entire class of plaintiffs-non-client
beneficiaries-from being able to state a claim for attorney malprac-
17. Swanson v. Ptak, 268 Neb. 265, 682 N.W.2d 225 (2004).
18. Id. at 266, 682 N.W.2d at 228.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 267, 682 N.W.2d at 228.
21. Id. at 267, 682 N.W.2d at 229.
22. Id. at 272, 682 N.W.2d at 232.
23. Id.
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tice. This seems incredibly problematic in a field that places a pre-
mium on professional competence and loyalty.2 4
This Note will argue that the Nebraska Supreme Court missed an
opportunity to reconsider the entrenched common law rule in Ne-
braska requiring privity in legal malpractice actions. Part II briefly
explores the role of privity nationally and in Nebraska, while Part III
discusses the facts of Swanson. Part IV explores the implied relation-
ship doctrine, concluding that the harshness of the privity require-
ment for clients who reasonably relied on what they assumed to be an
attorney-client relationship outweighs any benefits it may have to the
legal profession.
This Note does not suggest that any of the attorneys involved in
the Swanson dispute were professionally negligent or somehow es-
caped liability because of the privity requirement, nor should such
conclusions be inferred. It seems evident from the facts iterated by
the court that Ptak's actions were intended only to help Swanson pro-
cure a portion of her uncle's estate, a gift that her aunt's intestacy
effectively denied her. Accordingly, this Note only suggests that the
court should reevaluate the privity requirement, providing at least the
possibility of relief to non-clients whose professional negligence claims
are often summarily dismissed. At issue is whether a plaintiffs
claims should be barred from court because his relationship with the
attorney does not accord with traditional or contractual notions of the
attorney-client relationship and not whether any particular acts con-
stituted professional negligence.
II. PRIVITY IN CONTEXT
Because so many scholars have provided thorough reviews of the
privity requirement, 25 the intent of this Part is to provide but a brief
overview of the weight accorded the privity requirement in state
courts before addressing privity in Nebraska. However, malpractice
scholars Ronald Mallen and Jeffery Smith explain that while the
movement in state law is toward the abrogation of the strict privity
requirement, "[g]eneralizations concerning the state of the law are
neither accurate nor reliable" because the "rules concerning the re-
quirement of privity have been in a state of transition for almost three
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble para. 2, 4 (2003) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
25. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 7.5-7.9 (5th
ed. 2000); Jay M. Feinman, Attorney Liability to Nonclients, 31 TORT & INS. L.J.
735, 736-39 (1996); Bradley E.S. Fogel, Estate Planning Malpractice: Special Is-
sues in Need of Special Care, 17 PROB. PROP. 20, 20-22 (2003); Fogel, supra note
13, at 266-76; Jason D. Pinkall, From Barcelo to McCamish: A Call to Relax the
Privity Barrier in the Estate Planning Context in Texas, 37 Hous. L. REV. 1275,
1279-85 (2000); Volkmer, supra note 5, at 298-300.
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decades. [Nevertheless,] [p]articular facts, the subject matter, and the
relationship of the parties may create a duty of care."26
A. The Origins of Strict Privity
In a case for professional negligence against an attorney, the plain-
tiff-client or non-client-must establish that the attorney owed a
duty to adhere to a certain standard of care in his dealings with the
plaintiff.2 7 As a general rule, if an attorney and client are bound by a
contractual relationship-if they are in privity-the attorney has as-
sumed a duty to meet that standard of care. 28 Thus, by demonstrat-
ing that privity existed, generally by showing that there was a
contract between the parties, 2 9 a plaintiff can legally establish that
the attorney owed him or her a duty.3 0 Conversely, some malpractice
plaintiffs who cannot show that privity of contract existed are unable
26. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 25, § 7.5.
27. Moore v. Anderson Zeigler Disharoon Gallagher & Gray, P.C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d
888, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); see also Gravel v. Schmidt, 247 Neb. 404, 408, 527
N.W.2d 199, 202 (1995) (holding that plaintiffs alleging legal malpractice must
demonstrate, as per a typical negligence claim, that the attorney owed plaintiff a
duty, that the duty was breached, and that the breach caused plaintiffs dam-
ages); Begleiter, supra note 1, at 281 (observing that "[ain attorney is liable,
whether in contract or in negligence, only if he had a duty to the party making
the claim"). Note that, in addition to professional negligence, there are a variety
of methods through which a plaintiff can seek recovery for legal malfeasance,
including negligent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Buras v. Marx, 892 So. 2d 83, 85
(La. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that the elements for a negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim include "1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship, 2) negli-
gent misrepresentation by the attorney, and 3) damages caused by the alleged
negligence"); MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 25, § 7.14. An individual could also
sue in the wills and estates context under the tort of interference with expectancy
of inheritance, which provides that "[o]ne who by fraud, duress or other tortious
means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an in-
heritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to
the other for the loss of the inheritance or gift." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 774B (1979). However, because negligence-based actions are "the most common
form of a legal malpractice action," MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 25, § 8.13, and
because Nebraska legal malpractice cases are pleaded as professional negligence
actions, Gravel, 247 Neb. at 408, 527 N.W.2d at 202, professional negligence ac-
tions are the focus here.
28. See generally Bradley Ctr. Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Ga. 1982) (ob-
serving, in the context of a medical malpractice suit, that privity creates a rela-
tionship between the two parties "establish[ing] the legal duty to conform to a
standard of conduct").
29. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 93 (5th ed. 1984).
30. Id. Keeton explains the fact that the contractually-based relationship nonethe-
less creates a tort-based duty: "[B]y entering into a contract with A, the defen-
dant may place himself in such a relation toward B that the law will impose upon
him an obligation sounding in tort and not in contract, to act in such a way that B
will not be injured." Id.
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to establish that a duty existed and cannot state a claim for profes-
sional negligence.
The existence of the privity bar to third-party malpractice actions
has its historical roots in English common law.31 In Winterbottom v.
Wright,3 2 the Exchequer of Pleas refused the claim of a plaintiff in-
jured when a coach "gave way and broke down."3 3 The court held that
there was "no privity of contract between these parties; and if the
plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along
the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a
similar action."34 The court rejected the suit because there was no
privity, expressing its concern that individuals might have open-en-
ded liability to third parties if any third party could bring suit demon-
strating a contractual relationship.
Thirty-seven years later in National Savings Bank of District of
Columbia v. Ward,35 the U.S. Supreme Court followed the holding in
Winterbottom, explaining that "[b]eyond all doubt, the general rule is
that the obligation of the attorney is to his client and not to a third
party.., unless there is something in the circumstances of this case to
take it out of that general rule."3 6 At issue in Savings Bank was
whether an attorney who engaged in a title search for his client could
be held liable by a third party, who relying on the attorney's conclu-
sions, loaned money to the client, who then defaulted.3 7 The Supreme
Court denied recovery for the third party plaintiff, observing "that
there was no relation between the parties from which any contract
could be implied, nor any relation between the parties from which any
duty could arise."38 In justifying the Court's decision, Justice Clifford
again invoked what seems to be the most often cited reason for limit-
ing attorney liability: he explained that "[tihe only safe rule is to con-
fine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract; if we go
one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty."39
State courts that followed this line of cases in professional mal-
practice cases typically held that "privity of contract was required
before a tort action could arise from a breach of duty created by con-
tract-i.e., limiting liability to contracting parties."40 The privity re-
31. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 25, § 7.5.
32. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
33. Id. at 402.
34. Id. at 405.
35. 100 U.S. 195 (1879) (memorandum).
36. Id. at 200. The court cited Winterbottom later in the case as support for this
conclusion. Id. at 203.
37. Id. at 195-98.
38. Id. at 200.
39. Id. at 203.
40. Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 55 P.3d 1054, 1059 (Okla. 2002). As this quote indicates, a
central concern among privity advocates is courts' inability to limit an attorney's
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quirement thus served two purposes. First, liability was limited to the
attorney and client who contracted together, so third parties who were
not parties to an existing contract, including non-client beneficiaries,
were unable to establish liability even if the attorney breached the
contract. Second, privity activated the liability arising from an attor-
ney's breach of contract because liability was limited to the con-
tracting client. Without privity there was no duty, so without privity
there was no actionable breach.
Today, only nine states continue to recognize the strict privity re-
quirement in legal malpractice cases in the estate law field,41 includ-
ing Nebraska, Arkansas, Alabama, New York, Ohio, and Maryland.42
The privity requirements in these states may be set out in statutory or
common law forms, or both. In Arkansas, for example, the General
Assembly has codified the strict privity rule in professional malprac-
tice cases, stating clearing that "[n]o person licensed to practice law in
Arkansas ... shall be liable to persons not in privity of contract with
the person ... for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions, deci-
sions, or other conduct in connection with professional services per-
formed by the person.. .... "43 In Alabama, the common law insulates
liability to certain third parties in certain factual situations. However, as is dis-
cussed infra in section IV.C, the states that have adopted standing rules in legal
malpractice cases other than strict privity-a majority of U.S. states-have found
ways to limit professional malpractice liability to case-by-case determinations of
the facts therein.
41. Begleiter, supra note 1, at 282; see also MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 25, § 7.7
(observing the waning influence of the strict privity doctrine nationwide).
42. See, e.g., Robinson v. Benton, 842 So. 2d 631 (Ala. 2002) (declining to abrogate
privity and adopt a third-party beneficiary approach out of concern that liability
for attorneys would be exponentially expanded); Jackson v. Ivory, 120 S.W.3d 587
(Ark. 2003) (holding that Arkansas's statutory scheme requires that a plaintiff
"have direct privity of contract with the" attorney in a liability action); Noble v.
Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1275 (Md. 1998) (declining to 'create a new rule in Mary-
land governing attorney liability to nonclients arising out of will drafting or es-
tate planning"); Swanson v. Ptak, 268 Neb. 265, 270, 682 N.W.2d 225, 230 (2004)
("Under Nebraska law, a lawyer owes a duty to his or her client to use reasonable
care and skill in the discharge of his or her duties, but ordinarily this duty does
not extend to third parties absent facts establishing a duty to them."); Mali v. De
Forest & Duer, 553 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that "li[t is
well established in New York that, absent fraud, collusion, malicious acts or
other circumstances, [attorneys] are not liable to the beneficiaries of such will or
other third parties not in privity"); Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638
(Ohio 1987) (per curiam) (observing that "an attorney may not be held liable by
third parties as a result of having performed services on behalf of a client, in good
faith, unless the third party is in privity with the client for whom the legal ser-
vices were performed, or unless the attorney acts with malice").
43. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-310(a) (Lexis 1999). Arkansas's statute does provide ex-
ceptions in cases of fraud or intentional misrepresentation or, in very specific
factual situations, if "a primary intent of the client was for the professional ser-
vices to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action." Id. § 16-
22-310(a)(2). However, this intent-based exception only applies if the attorney
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attorneys from malpractice liability, because they "owe[I no duty ex-
cept that arising from contract or a gratuitous undertaking."44
Courts in New York and Ohio are adamant that strict privity is
"well-established" in their states.4 5 For example, in a 1987 case, the
Ohio Supreme Court rejected a young man's claim that his father's
will was negligently drafted. 46 The will promised both the son and the
father's second wife a one-third share of the father's estate.4 7 How-
ever, the father and second wife had signed a prenuptial agreement
three years before the will was drafted that gave the second wife an
interest in the father's estate.48 When the father died, the second wife
claimed both her share under the will and the prenuptial agreement,
and the probate court granted both.49 The son's mother then filed suit
for malpractice on his behalf, arguing that the drafting attorney was
negligent for having failed to "renounce the antenuptial agreement or
make any provision in the will creating a setoff as a result of the debt
created by the antenuptial agreement." 50 The Ohio Supreme Court
rejected these claims, holding that "an attorney may not be held liable
by third parties as a result of having performed services on behalf of a
client, in good faith, unless the third party is in privity with the client
for whom the legal services were performed, or unless the attorney
acts with malice."51
Regardless of whether the privity requirement arises from statute
or common law, its effect is to deny recovery to individuals who are not
in a contractual relationship with the allegedly negligent attorney and
thus to individuals the court classifies as non-clients. Because their
approaches are closer to the historic English and American common
law cases that denied recovery absent a contractual relationship,
states that continue to require strict privity in legal malpractice ac-
tions have dutifully ignored or dismissed the fact that most states
provides a writing to the client explaining who the beneficiaries of the profes-
sional services would be and then sends a copy of the writing to the beneficiary.
The beneficiaries who were "intended to so rely" on the attorney's services could
then maintain an action against the attorney, but the Arkansas Supreme Court
denied recovery in one instance to children who sued for malpractice because a
copy of the codicil that would have provided their devises had never been sent to
them. Jackson, 120 S.W.3d at 595; McDonald v. Pettus, 988 S.W.2d 9 (Ark. 1999).
This writing requirement seems to approach, at least in formality, a contractual
requirement between the third party and attorney.
44. Robinson, 842 So. 2d at 635 (quoting Shows v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of N.C., 585 So.
2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1991)).
45. Mali, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 392; Simon, 512 N.E.2d at 638.
46. Simon, 512 N.E.2d at 637.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The opinion is not explicit, but presumably the wife's claim of both "shares" de-
creased the portion of the estate available to the son.
50. Simon, 512 N.E.2d at 637.
51. Id. at 638.
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have now abrogated the privity requirement. Again, the continued ad-
herence to the privity requirement seems to reflect decisions by the
courts in these states, first, that no actionable duty exists to non-cli-
ents and, second, that non-clients are not entitled to recover damages
from negligent attorneys.
B. The New Majority: States without a Strict Privity
Requirement
Currently, only nine states continue to require contractual privity
for plaintiffs alleging legal malpractice claims arising from wills and
estates transactions. 5 2 The modern state law trend is to recognize
"the existence of a duty beyond the confines of those in privity to the
attorney-client contract."53 Among states that have abrogated strict
privity, two of the most commonly-invoked alternatives to strict priv-
ity are the California balancing approach54 and the "Florida-Iowa"
rule.55
The California balancing test was first set out in 1958 in Biakanja
v. Irving,56 a case that signaled the beginning of the end of the strict
privity requirement.5 7 In Biakanja, the plaintiff sued the notary pub-
lic that drafted her brother's will after the court denied probate be-
cause the will had been improperly attested. 58 Where the plaintiff
would have received the entire estate under her brother's will, she re-
ceived only a one-eighth share under California's intestacy laws.59
Thus, as a result of the mistaken attestation, the plaintiff lost a signif-
icant portion of her brother's estate. The California Supreme Court,
observing that the state had required privity in professional negli-
gence actions, held that:
[WIhether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third person
not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various fac-
tors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty
52. Begleiter, supra note 1, at 282; see also MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 25, § 7.7
("Relying upon annotations and commentators, some courts have said that a
strict privity requirement is the majority rule. Such comments may reflect the
holdings and dictum of the majority of the decisions under particular facts, but do
not accurately characterize the state of the law in the United States.").
53. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 25, § 7.8.
54. Fogel, supra note 13, at 271.
55. Id. at 283. Scholarship on privity in the malpractice context has flourished in
light of these changes. The Maryland Court of Appeals noted that the topic "has
been the subject of many articles in recent years." Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264,
1268 (Md. Ct. App. 1998).
56. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
57. Volkmer, supra note 5, at 298-99 (observing that the decision in Biakanja
marked the beginning of the California Supreme Court's privity "revolution").
58. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19.
59. Id.
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that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.
6 0
Because the notary's behavior "was not only negligent but was also
highly improper" and "[s]uch conduct should be discouraged and not
protected by immunity from civil liability," the court held that holding
the plaintiff to a privity requirement would be inappropriate. 6 1 Im-
portantly, the court did not conclude that all third-party plaintiffs
would be allowed to state a cause of action for legal malpractice.
Rather, it set out a fact-dependent test, outlined above, that neither
allowed, nor precluded, every third-party malpractice claim.
Three years after its decision in Biakanja, the California Supreme
Court affirmed the balancing test in Lucas v. Hamm.6 2 The holding in
Lucas has since been utilized by courts in other states, including Wis-
consin, Hawaii, Minnesota, and Connecticut.6 3 Because it allows a
plaintiff to make out a legal malpractice claim without demonstrating
strict privity, states that have adopted this approach emphasize the
attorney's action and the plaintiffs harm, rather than whether the
plaintiff has pleaded facts suggesting the existence of a formal attor-
ney-client relationship.
The State of California also nurtured a second popular alternative
to strict privity in estate planning malpractice cases. 64 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals laid the framework for what scholars have
deemed the "Florida-Iowa Rule,"65 which uses the decedent's stated
intent as a benchmark for analyzing a third party's ability to recover
in a malpractice suit. First set out in Ventura County Humane Soci-
ety, Inc. v. Holloway,6 6 the Florida-Iowa rule provides, according to
60. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
61. Id.
62. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961). The First Division of the California Court of Appeals
recently reaffirmed the role of the balancing test in California jurisprudence, ob-
serving that, following Biakanja, the California Supreme Court considered two
additional factors to be critical to the duty determination. "One is the likelihood
that imposition of liability might interfere with the attorney's ethical duties to
the client .... The Supreme Court has also considered the related question of
whether the imposition of liability 'would impose an undue burden on the profes-
sion.'" Moore v. Anderson Zeigler Disharoon Gallagher & Gray, P.C., 135 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 888, 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted) (construing Goodman v.
Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1976); Lucas, 364 P.2d 685).
63. Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 84 (Conn. 1981); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 465 (Haw.
2001); Goldberger v. Kaplan, Strangis & Kaplan, 534 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (using the Lucas factors to determine the recovery of non-clients
under a third party beneficiary theory, but ultimately denying recovery to plain-
tiff); Auric v. Continental Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1983).
64. Fogel, supra note 13, at 283.
65. Id.
66. 115 Cal. Rptr. 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). Note that California no longer uses this
approach. See supra notes 32, 36 and accompanying text.
20051
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the Florida Supreme Court, "a limited exception to the strict privity
requirement... where it can be demonstrated that the apparent in-
tent of the client in engaging the services of the lawyer was to benefit
a third party."67 This approach is similar to a contract-based third
party beneficiary theory because it, according to the Iowa Supreme
Court, "focuses upon whether the primary purpose of the cli-
ent-attorney relationship was to benefit the non-client."68
Under the Florida-Iowa rule, the third-party plaintiff must show
that their (1) "interest in the estate is either lost, diminished, or un-
realized" and that (2) "the testator's intent as expressed in the testa-
mentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in part" as (3) a "direct
result of the lawyer's professional negligence." 69 Thus, the relation-
ship between the beneficiary and decedent, rather than the relation-
ship between the beneficiary and the attorney, is key under this test.
Again, courts using this approach neither preclude nor allow all third-
party plaintiffs to state a claim, but conduct a fact-dependent inquiry.
In addition to its use in Florida and Iowa, this intent-based approach
has been adopted in other states, including New Hampshire, Illinois,
and Oregon. 70
C. Indirect Privity and the Kurtenbach Approach
Set between the theoretical bookends of strict privity, which re-
quires a contractual relationship, and the California and Florida-Iowa
rules, which allow recovery to third parties outside the contract if the
facts of the case suggest that recovery is merited, is the notion of indi-
rect privity, or an implied attorney-client relationship. This third, but
limited, approach to an attorney's liability to a third party is based on
the notion that an attorney-client relationship can arise without a
contract through the implicit nature of attorney's and client's interac-
tion.7 1 In Kurtenbach v. TeKippe,7 2 the Iowa Supreme Court an-
67. Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1380
(Fla. 1993).
68. Blair, 21 P.3d at 460; see also Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 55 P.3d 1054, 1060-62
(Okla. 2002) (reviewing the third party beneficiary approach).
69. Holsapple v. McGrath, 575 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Schreiner v.
Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 1987)). The Iowa Supreme Court also allows
third parties to recover for negligence attending the preparation of nontestamen-
tary documents if the beneficiary can demonstrate that "he or she was specifically
identified, by the donor, as an object of the grantor's intent." Id. at 520.
70. See, e.g., Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318 (N.H. 1994); McLane v. Russell, 546
N.E.2d 499 (Ill. 1989); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289 (Or. 1987); see also Needham
v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060 (D.C. 1983).
71. George A. Locke, Existence of Attorney Client Relationship, 48 Am. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS 2d 525 (Westlaw 2004). Locke explains:
Although it is clear that not every instance of contact between a lawyer
and a lay party does result in the creation of an attorney-client relation-
ship, it is also true that in most jurisdictions such a relationship can
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nounced that it would be willing to imply an attorney-client
relationship if certain facts existed. Such a relationship
is created when (1) a person seeks advice or assistance from an attorney, (2)
the advice or assistance sought pertains to matters within the attorney's pro-
fessional competence, and (3) the attorney expressly or impliedly agrees to
give or actually gives the desired advice or assistance. 7 3
This last consent-related element "may be established by proof of det-
rimental reliance, when the person seeking legal services reasonably
relies on the attorney to provide them and the attorney, aware of such
reliance, does nothing to negate it."74
In Kurtenbach, an investor sued an attorney, TeKippe, with whom
he had no legal contract but who provided legal advice to him on sev-
eral occasions. 75 Kurtenbach sought TeKippe's advice in setting up
several corporations but failed to report sales of stock in the corpora-
tions to the Iowa Commissioner of Insurance, as was required under
Iowa law.76 The corporations' investors sued Kurtenbach "on a theory
of rescission because of his failure to report the stock sales," and
Kurtenbach in turn filed suit against TeKippe, alleging that TeKippe
had been negligent in failing "to advise him of his obligation to report
the sales."7 7 The Iowa Supreme Court outlined the test above, but
rejected Kurtenbach's claim, holding that while TeKippe had under-
taken some duties to Kurtenbach, investigation of the stock sales was
not one of them.78 Accordingly, the court declined to overturn the trial
court's determination that no attorney-client relationship existed. In
spite of this result, the Kurtenbach test has appeal, as is discussed in
section IV.A, infra, because it affords a remedy for some individuals
that rely on an attorney's advice or assistance, but does not completely
nullify the privity requirement.
come into being on the basis of relatively brief and informal interaction
directly or indirectly involving the parties.
Id.
72. 260 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1977). This doctrine has also been utilized by the Nebraska
Supreme Court. See Swanson v. Ptak, 268 Neb. 265, 266, 682 N.W.2d 225, 228
(2004) (holding that the plaintiff in an estate-related malpractice case may be
able to sidestep the strict privity requirement if she could establish an implied
attorney-client relationship).
73. Kurtenbach, 260 N.W.2d at 56 (construing Anderson v. Lundt, 206 N.W. 657
(Iowa 1925)).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 55.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 57.
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D. Professional Negligence in Nebraska
Despite its waning appeal on the national scene, 79 strict privity in
professional malpractice actions has been and remains the rule in Ne-
braska. The Nebraska Supreme Court has repeatedly held-fre-
quently without discussion 8O-that a "lawyer's duty to his or her
client . . .does not extend to third parties absent some facts which
establish a duty."8 ' As the use of the word "duty" may indicate, legal
malpractice actions in Nebraska are grounded in tort: while the "at-
torney-client relationship rests in contract,"8 2 a claim against an at-
torney for "professional misconduct does not give rise to a breach of
contract action, but, rather, gives rise to a professional negligence ac-
tion."8 3 Thus, in order to prove a professional negligence claim
against a lawyer, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that
the attorney had a duty to him or her, that the attorney breached that
duty, and that this breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
damages.8 4
Drawing on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Savings Bank,
the Nebraska Supreme Court announced in 1980 that a "lawyer owes
a duty to his client to use reasonable care and skill in the discharge of
his duties, but ordinarily this duty does not extend to third parties."8 5
At issue in the Nebraska case of Ames Bank v. Hahn8 6 were allega-
tions of negligence by the bank against attorney Howard F. Hahn in
connection with a real estate transaction.8 7 The bank pleaded that a
deed drafted by Hahn did not correctly identify the property at issue,
79. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 25, § 7.8.
80. Volkmer, supra note 5, at 295.
81. Gravel v. Schmidt, 247 Neb. 404, 409, 527 N.W.2d 199, 203 (1995); Earth Sci.
Lab., Inc. v. Adkins & Wondra, 246 Neb. 798, 801, 523 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1994);
Landrigan v. Nelson, 227 Neb. 835, 836, 420 N.W.2d 313, 314 (1988).
82. Gravel, 247 Neb. at 408, 527 N.W.2d at 202.
83. Id.
84. Id. Nebraska law assigns certain duties to attorneys. To wit,
[i]t is the duty of an attorney and counselor: (1) To maintain the respect
due to the courts ofjustice and to judicial officers; (2) to counsel or main-
tain no other actions, proceedings or defenses than those which appear
to him legal and just, except the defense of a person charged with a pub-
lic offense; (3) to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the cause con-
fided to him, such means only as are consistent with the truth; (4) to
maintain inviolate the confidence, and, at any peril to himself, to pre-
serve the secrets of his clients; (5) to abstain from all offensive practices
and to advise no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged; (6) not to encourage the commencement or continuance of an
action or proceeding from any motive of passion or interest.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 7-105 (Supp. 2003).
85. Ames Bank v. Hahn, 205 Neb. 353, 356, 287 N.W.2d 687, 689 (1980) (emphasis
added).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 354-55, 287 N.W.2d at 688-89.
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and that it had "relied upon the misrepresentations made by Hahn"
that the company offering mortgages on the land as security actually
owned the land described.88 The Douglas County District Court dis-
missed the claims, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, hold-
ing that the bank offered no evidence that Hahn, who was not its
attorney, owed it any duty of reasonable care.8 9
The rule established in Ames Bank proved to be popular with the
court, and it has often been repeated in the years leading up to its
2004 decision in Swanson, in which the court rejected the plaintiffs
attempt to, using the court's previous language, "enlarge the scope of
an attorney's liability to third parties."90 The court's decision in
Swanson echoed previous Nebraska jurisprudence in the area of es-
tate planning malpractice, which likewise echoed the decision in Ames
Bank. Simply put, "an attorney who drafts a will owes no duty to the
beneficiaries, but, rather, owes a duty to the decedent only."9 1 Thus,
the attorney only owes a duty to his client.
As was seen above, other states' methods for dealing with privity
include balancing equitable considerations like reliance and the dece-
dent's intent. These alternatives to the traditional notion of contrac-
tual privity let plaintiffs state a cause of action for professional
negligence even if they lack a contract. The Nebraska Supreme Court
has contemplated two methods through which a third-party plaintiff
could establish an attorney's duty without a contract, although it has
construed both approaches so narrowly as to make them virtually
worthless for Nebraska malpractice plaintiffs.
First, if a plaintiff and the attorney lacked a contract, the court
allows the plaintiff to present "some [other] facts which establish a
duty."92 In other words, in the absence of an express contract for ser-
vices, a third-party plaintiff may be able to limbo under the privity bar
if she can demonstrate other facts that show a duty on the attorney's
behalf.93 However, the court does not explain what facts might estab-
88. Id. at 354, 287 N.W.2d at 688.
89. Id. at 357, 287 N.W.2d at 689.
90. Landrigan v. Nelson, 227 Neb. 835, 836, 420 N.W.2d 313, 314 (1988).
91. In re Estate of Snover, 4 Neb. App. 533, 549, 546 N.W.2d 341, 352 (1996).
92. Gravel v. Schmidt, 247 Neb. 404, 409, 527 N.W.2d 199, 203 (1995); Landrigan,
227 Neb. at 836, 420 N.W.2d at 314; Ames Bank, 205 Neb. at 356, 287 N.W.2d at
689.
93. Accordingly, this seems to be just a method through which a malpractice plaintiff
could evidence an attorney-client relationship without showing that she signed a
contract with the attorney. If this is true, the "facts establishing a duty" stan-
dard does not eliminate the privity requirement but merely provides a different




lish a duty under this standard,9 4 although it frequently rejects the
possibility that the plaintiff has actually demonstrated such facts.95
In fact, because the court has repeatedly endorsed its privity require-
ment, Nebraska scholar Ronald Volkmer suggests that the "fact that
the will beneficiary is a 'nonclient' ends the matter. Unless the Ne-
braska court is willing to reconsider its position, there are no facts
which can be pleaded to 'establish the duty."' 9 6
Second, the court suggested in 1991 that the plaintiff may be able
to establish an implied attorney-client relationship. In McVaney v.
Baird, Holm, McEachen, Pedersen, Hamann & Strasheim,97 the court
adopted the implied relationship approach first set out by the Iowa
Supreme Court in Kurtenbach v. TeKippe.98 When the building that
held McVaney's veterinary practice was "destroyed by a natural gas
explosion," McVaney hired a law firm to help him obtain an insurance
claim for his loss. 99 Although he was able to recover under the insur-
ance policy, he sued the firm for malpractice, alleging that it failed to
file a negligence claim on his behalf against the local utility company,
despite the law firm's oral agreement to do so.100 Because the firm
represented McVaney in other matters and because Baird Holm attor-
ney Gerald Laughlin frequently discussed with McVaney the possibil-
ity of filing an action against the utility company, the court held that
"a reasonable finder of fact could determine that the [client-attorney]
relationship existed" with respect to this claim.lOl Although the court
ultimately affirmed a verdict for the law firm on other grounds, the
court allowed McVaney to state a malpractice action against the firm.
Despite the flexibility that the implied relationship approach could
provide to plaintiffs,1 0 2 McVaney is the only case in which the court
allowed a claim on the basis of an implied relationship. The court has
since held that the facts of McVaney-particularly the longstanding
94. Importantly, although the court has yet to elaborate on this standard, it has
never held that issues like the decedent's intent or the harm to the plaintiff were
facts that could establish a duty.
95. See, e.g., Landrigan, 227 Neb. at 836, 420 N.W.2d at 314 (observing that "no at-
torney-client relationship existed between appellants and defendants, and.., no
other facts or circumstances were shown which establish a duty to appellants");
Ames Bank, 205 Neb. at 356, 287 N.W.2d at 689 ("There was no allegation that
Hahn was employed by the plaintiff, and there was no allegation of facts which
would otherwise establish a duty from Hahn to the plaintiff.").
96. Volkmer, supra note 5, at 318 (emphasis added).
97. 237 Neb. 451, 466 N.W.2d 499 (1991).
98. 260 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1977).
99. McVaney, 237 Neb. at 453, 466 N.W.2d at 503.
100. Id. at 456-57, 466 N.W.2d at 505.
101. Id. at 460, 466 N.W.2d at 506-07.
102. Admittedly, the Kurtenbach approach, while providing more means through
which a plaintiff can state a case, also provides additional liability for attorneys
currently protected by the strict privity requirement.
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relationship between Baird Holm and McVaney-are requirements
for a court to imply an attorney-client relationship.10 3 As will be set
out in Part IV, infra, this narrow conception of an "implied relation-
ship" prevents the court from providing an equitable result for many
plaintiffs who are otherwise barred from presenting their claims to a
jury.
III. LEOTA'S LOSS TO BEAR: THE FACTS OF SWANSON
Finally, we turn to the Nebraska Supreme Court's most recent en-
dorsement of the privity requirement in attorney malpractice cases.
The controversy in Swanson v. Ptak104 stems from an apparently er-
rant distribution made from a decedent's estate to a relative who
would not have received a distribution under Nebraska's intestacy
laws. In 1998, Norfolk, Nebraska resident Wilma L. Pritchard died
intestate, leaving an estate of approximately $1 million.105 The estate
consisted largely of gifts that Wilma inherited from her husband, Al-
lan Pritchard, who passed away in 1997.106 Norfolk attorney David
H. Ptak had previously represented the Pritchards, and family mem-
bers, including Allan's niece, Leota Swanson, gathered at his office fol-
lowing Wilma's death. At that meeting, Ptak explained the
distribution of Wilma's estate under Nebraska's intestacy laws and
suggested that Wilma's only relatives-her brother, Thomas Fillmore,
and her sister, Nona Wittler1O7-inherit the entirety of the estate "un-
less they agreed to surrender half of the estate to Allan's family, in-
cluding Swanson."10 8 Ptak then "diagrammed for the family members
the approximate distribution of the estate if such an agreement were
reached," which would have included a $250,000 share for Swan-
son.10 9 The family appointed Ptak as the estate's personal represen-
tative, and he sent a letter on October 7, 1998, to the interested family
members discussing this plan to share the estate. The letter included
the following language:
If this is correct and you are agreeable to this distribution of the estate, I will
need to prepare an agreement to be signed by Wilma's heirs which consents to
103. Swanson v. Ptak, 268 Neb. 265, 270-71, 682 N.W.2d 225, 231 (2004).
104. 268 Neb. 265, 682 N.W.2d 225.
105. Id. at 266, 682 N.W.2d at 228.
106. The couple was childless and Allan died intestate, so Wilma inherited the total of
his estate in accord with Nebraska's intestacy laws. In Nebraska, the surviving
spouse receives the "entire intestate estate" if the decedent has no surviving chil-
dren or parent. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2302 (Supp. 2003). If the decedent was
widowed and had no surviving children or parents, the intestate estate would be
distributed to the decedent's parents' issue through representation. Id. § 30-
2303(3).
107, Wittler was deceased by the time the Nebraska Supreme Court decided the case
in July 2004.
108, Swanson, 268 Neb. at 266, 682 N.W.2d at 228.
109. Id. at 266, 682 N.W.2d at 228.
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this distribution. I met with Nona Wittler last week and went over this distri-
bution with her and she is agreeable to it.1 1 0
Correspondence between the parties, including Swanson, continued in
this vein, with Ptak suggesting that the estate would be split in half
between the Pritchards' heirs.
Apparently believing she would soon receive part of her aunt's es-
tate, Swanson asked Ptak in June 1999 for an early portion of her
share so she could purchase a condominium. In response, Ptak sent
her a check for $99,000.111 However, Swanson's claim on the estate
then deteriorated rapidly, as Wilma's siblings informed Ptak that they
would not share the estate. 1 12 Ptak asked Swanson to return the
$99,000 distribution and then filed suit against her when the money
was not returned. Swanson then filed suit against Ptak alleging pro-
fessional negligence, breach of contract, and negligent failure to fur-
nish accurate information. 113 Swanson also "alleged that Ptak's
negligence caused her (1) to incur legal fees defending against Ptak's
lawsuit for the return of the $99,000, (2) to make gifts to each of her
two children of $10,000, and (3) to fail to receive the remaining
$90,900 of her one-fourth share of Wilma's estate."114
In the District Court of Madison County, Ptak was successful in
moving to strike the third allegation and in moving for summary judg-
ment, which the court granted following a determination that "Ptak
owed no legal duty to Swanson."115 Swanson appealed this finding
and the dismissal of her case, and the Nebraska Supreme Court took
up the issue. Explaining that "[u]nder Nebraska law, a lawyer owes a
duty to his or her client to use reasonable care and skill in the dis-
charge of his or her duties,"1"6 the court rejected Swanson's contention
that she had been Ptak's client because they had no written agree-
ment and he never billed her for any services.117 Further, it rejected
her assertion that a relationship existed because "she 'felt' that as per-
sonal representative of the estate, he was representing her legal inter-
ests."1 1 8 The court explained that Ptak, who was both an attorney
and personal representative of Wilma's estate, provided legal services
to himself as personal representative and thus could not have pro-
vided services to her, and affirmed summary judgment for Ptak.119
110. Id. at 266, 682 N.W.2d at 228.
111. Id. at 267, 682 N.W.2d at 228.
112. The court noted that "[in his subsequent deposition testimony, Fillmore denied
that he had ever agreed to share any portion of the estate with Swanson." Id.
113. Id. at 267, 682 N.W.2d at 229.
114. Id. at 267-68, 682 N.W.2d at 229.
115. Id. at 266, 682 N.W.2d at 228.
116. Id. at 270, 682 N.W.2d at 230.
117. Id. at 269, 682 N.W.2d at 230.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 269-70, 682 N.W.2d at 230.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court alluded to the possibility that Swan-
son could have demonstrated other "facts establishing [Ptak's] duty"
or an implied attorney-client relationship, but ultimately held that
neither existed. 120 First, the court held that Swanson offered no facts
establishing a duty on Ptak's part given the "tenuous" nature of their
associations.121 Again, this seemed like Swanson's opportunity to
demonstrate that Ptak owed her a duty even without a contract, but
the court, as had been Volkmer's prediction,122 outright rejected this
possibility for third parties in the wills and estates context: "[Tihe
duty of a lawyer who drafts a will on behalf of a client does not extend
to heirs or purported beneficiaries who claim injury resulting from
negligent draftsmanship."123 In effect, because of the privity require-
ment, there is no way that wills and estates malpractice plaintiffs in
Nebraska can establish a duty other than through an attorney-client
relationship. Failing as she did to establish an attorney-client rela-
tionship, the court rejected Swanson's claim, concluding that "Ptak
had no professional duty to secure a gratuitous agreement from
Wilma's heirs for the benefit of Swanson."124
Second, the court rejected the conclusion that Swanson had an im-
plied relationship with Ptak under the Kurtenbach125 test. Recalling
its decision in McVaney, 126 the court noted that it had acknowledged
an implied attorney-client relationship because "there was evidence of
a longstanding relationship between the client and the attorney and
there was both general and specific discussion of what action the cli-
ent wished the attorney to undertake with regard to a specific mat-
ter."127 The court then read these facts as narrowing the application
of Kurtenbach, and denied recovery, because Swanson only demon-
strated that "she understood that Ptak was advocating for her" and
there was no pre-existing attorney-client relationship or contract.1 28
Again, the existence of a formal attorney-client relationship rules the
court's analysis, in spite of its attention to other facts or implications
that might give rise to a legal duty. By falling back on its decision in
McVaney and other strict privity cases, the court in Swanson refused
to revisit Nebraska's continued adherence to this requirement, a posi-
tion that makes less sense in light of national trends.
120. Id. at 271, 682 N.W.2d at 231.
121. Id. at 272, 682 N.W.2d at 231.
122. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
123. Swanson, 268 Neb. at 272, 682 N.W.2d at 231.
124. Id. at 271, 682 N.W.2d at 231.
125. Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1977). See supra section II.C.
126. McVaney v. Baird, Holm, McEachen, Pedersen, Hamann & Strasheim, 237 Neb.
451, 466 N.W.2d 499 (1991).




IV. NEBRASKA'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY
Nebraska's continued adherence to the privity requirement runs
contrary to the increasing willingness of states to reconsider, loosen,
or abrogate the privity requirement altogether. In the 1990s,
[sitate courts nationwide re-examined the "strict privity" rule and found the
rule wanting. The "modern trend," the new assault upon the citadel of privity,
was proceeding "apace" once more. Against this onslaught stood a lonely out-
post of state court decisions, clinging to the bar of privity. No state court stood
out so starkly and lonely as the Nebraska Supreme Court.
1 2 9
Nebraska's highest court is aware of its increasingly unique position
in malpractice jurisprudence. Nebraska's pattern jury instructions,
which are drafted by the court, acknowledge that "[tihe Court retains
a conservative view of the liability of attorneys to third parties," even
though "other jurisdictions have expanded attorney liability to third
persons in specialized circumstances." 13 0 However. this self-aware-
ness did not induce the court to reconsider its position in Swanson.
At issue is not simply whether Nebraska is out of step with the
majority of state courts. 13 1 Instead, the crux of the matter is the abil-
ity of individuals who cannot evidence an attorney-client relationship
to nonetheless have their day in court when they have experienced a
loss because of an attorney's professional negligence. In order to pro-
vide some means of recovery for individuals like Swanson, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court should abrogate or, at the very least, ease
Nebraska's privity requirement. Since the majority of states have
eliminated the privity requirement, it is not difficult to suggest that
"[tihe requirement of privity in a legal malpractice action should be
put to a well-deserved burial."132 However, if the court is not pre-
pared to abrogate the requirement altogether, it might instead make
the Kurtenbach approach a meaningful tool for plaintiffs' recovery.
Given the unique facts in her case, even lightening the strict privity
requirement would not guarantee Swanson a recovery, as a jury still
may not have found Ptak liable. But, should the court give real weight
to the Kurtenbach idea, plaintiffs whose reliance on an attorney's ac-
tions which lead them to incur some monetary injury may at least be
able to present their cases to a jury.
129. Volkmer, supra note 5, at 300. Volkmer also observed in 1995 that the Nebraska
Supreme Court had "recently declined an opportunity to re-visit the issue of priv-
ity." Id. at 296. Volkmer's observation is as applicable following Swanson as it
was in 1995.
130. Nebraska Civil Jury Instructions 2d, Ch. 12, Comment X (2004) (quoting Harvey
Perlman, Annual Institute on the Annual Survey of Nebraska Law, Nebraska
Tort Law 1987-1988, Review and Comments 1 (1988)).
131. Volkmer, supra note 5, at 295-96.
132. Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 639 (Ohio 1987) (Brown, J., dissenting).
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A. Privity as Proof of No Duty
The key feature of the strict privity requirement is that, in those
states that require it, a lack of privity typically precludes discussion of
whether a duty existed. Courts imagine that the duty flows from the
contractual relationship, so if the attorney and non-client are not
bound by a contractual relationship, the attorney is held to have had
no legal duty to her. Because no duty can exist outside the contract,
the privity requirement effectively bars an entire class of plaintiffs-
non-client beneficiaries-from being able to state a claim for attorney
malpractice.
It is for this reason that many states, including California and
Florida, have abrogated the direct privity requirement. The rules
adopted in these states, including the balancing-' 33 and intent-
based'34 schemes, focus on the circumstances of the particular case.
Rather than precluding discussion of the nature of the plaintiffs
claims by reverting (or perhaps regressing) to a determination that
the plaintiffs claims are barred by a lack of contractual privity, these
states consider factors such as the decedent's intent 13 5 and the fore-
seeability of the plaintiffs harm. 136
By contrast, states that require strict privity do not often discuss
these kinds of equitable considerations-considerations that reflect
the compensatory element of tort negligence actions.137 In Swanson,
Swanson requested that Ptak, while believing that he represented
her, make a $99,000 distribution from the estate to purchase a condo-
minium and make gifts to her children. 138 The court regarded Swan-
son's belief that Ptak was her attorney as misinformed, 139 at least in
part because it observed that Ptak had no legal authority as personal
representative to distribute funds to Swanson. 14 0 The court's conclu-
sion notwithstanding, it seems easy to infer that Swanson did, in fact,
rely on Ptak's actions by using the distribution she received. Yet
Swanson, because the court pays no heed to these equitable considera-
133. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961); Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal.
1958).
134. Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.
1993); Holsapple v. McGrath, 575 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 1998).
135. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19.
136. See, e.g., id. (considering the "foreseeability of harm" to the plaintiff); Holsapple,
575 N.W.2d at 520 (considering whether the plaintiff at issue had foreseeably
relied on the attorney's actions).
137. THoMAs H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 1 (2001).
138. Swanson v. Ptak, 268 Neb. 265, 267, 682 N.W.2d 225, 228 (2004).
139. Id. at 270, 682 N.W.2d at 230 (explaining that "[a]lthough Swanson's unilateral
belief that Ptak was acting as her attorney may have been sincere, it was based
on a misunderstanding of his duties as personal representative of the estate")
(emphasis added).
140. Id. at 271, 682 N.W.2d at 231 (holding that Ptak "could [not] compel persons who
are lawful heirs to share the estate with persons who are not").
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tions, has no remedy. Again, at issue here is not whether the distribu-
tion-or any other actions by Ptak-was negligent, but whether a
plaintiff should be summarily barred from bringing the issue of negli-
gence to a jury, in spite of her reliance, because she did not sign a
contract with the attorney.
B. Abrogation and an Alternative: The Kurtenbach
Approach
Because the strict privity requirement precludes the Nebraska Su-
preme Court from considering issues like an individual's reliance on
an attorney's action or the foreseeability of that reliance, the court
should eliminate the privity requirement. There is potentially too
much to be lost by beneficiaries-namely the right to state a claim and
have their day in court-to completely preclude them from recovery
simply because they lack a contractual relationship. However, if the
court is unwilling to abrogate strict privity, it has another alternative.
The court can breathe life into the alternative to strict privity it has
only once invoked by allowing plaintiffs to reach a jury by demonstrat-
ing an implied relationship. 141 Rather than narrowing recovery under
Kurtenbach to factual situations similar to those in McVaney, 14 2
namely the pre-existing attorney-client relationship, the Nebraska
Supreme Court ought to analyze each case individually using the
Kurtenbach factors. Again, the Kurtenbach test allows the plaintiff to
establish an implied attorney-client relationship if she can demon-
strate the following:
(1) a person [sought] advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or
assistance sought pertain[ed] to matters within the attorney's professional
competence, and (3) the attorney expressly or impliedly agree[d] to give or
actually gives the desired advice or assistance.1 4 3
The facts of Swanson, at least as identified in the opinion, seem to fit
the elements of the Kurtenbach test. First, Swanson sought the advice
of an attorney. Along with the other members of her family, Swanson
visited with Ptak following the death of her aunt-in-law in order to
seek his advice about the distribution of the estate. 14 4 Wilma did not
have a will, so the meeting was not held simply to facilitate the distri-
bution of prearranged transfers. Rather, it seems the family sought
Ptak's legal advice as to the distribution of Wilma's property under
Nebraska's intestacy laws. Second, the information Swanson sought
seems to have been within the scope of Ptak's professional compe-
141. Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1977).
142. McVaney v. Baird, Holm, McEachen, Pedersen, Hamann & Strasheim, 237 Neb.
451, 466 N.W.2d 499 (1991).
143. Kurtenbach, 260 N.W.2d at 56 (construing Anderson v. Lundt, 206 N.W. 657
(Iowa 1925)).
144. Swanson, 268 Neb. at 266, 682 N.W.2d at 228.
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tence, at least because he was familiar enough with Nebraska's intes-
tacy laws to suggest a distribution scheme to the family. 14 5 Finally,
the court might imply Ptak's agreement to give the advice or assis-
tance because he communicated with the family to coordinate Swan-
son's distribution and provided her with the initial $99,000 share.' 46
This "thicker"14 7 consideration of the plaintiffs case, in which facts
like the attorney's agreement to give advice are at issue, is more fair
for plaintiffs than dismissing the case upon an initial determination
that no privity exists. The importance of the Kurtenbach approach is
to provide plaintiffs with, at the very least, the opportunity to present
their cases to a jury. But for the implied relationship test to be a
meaningful resource for plaintiffs, the Nebraska Supreme Court must
expand its interpretation of an implied relationship beyond facts indi-
cating the plaintiff and attorney had a longstanding relationship, as
seems to be required under McVaney. 148
Importantly, under Kurtenbach, third-party plaintiffs would still
be required to show that they had a substantial interaction with the
attorney. The approach merely provides a different-not necessarily
lower-evidentiary burden for the third party: in lieu of providing evi-
dence of an express oral or written contract identifying a relationship
between the parties, the plaintiff can instead offer evidence sug-
gesting legal advice was sought and purposefully given by the attor-
ney. In other words, the attorney must still owe a duty to the third
party, but the court allows the plaintiff to use evidence other than a
written or oral contract to establish this duty. Thus, the implied rela-
tionship test provides a different method for the plaintiff to demon-
strate that an attorney-client relationship existed but does not
completely eliminate the privity requirement. Regardless of which
path it may ultimately take, the court missed an opportunity in Swan-
son to fully reconsider the role of privity in professional malpractice
cases in Nebraska.
C. The Myth of "Automatic Liability"
Admittedly, Swanson may not have found relief in Nebraska even
if the privity restriction was loosened, or abolished altogether, because
even "[a]bolishing the privity rule does not automatically make law-
yers liable."14 9 The ability to state a claim, as in any case, does not
guarantee a victory on the facts. Swanson might have lost her case
145. Id.
146. Id. at 266-67, 682 N.W.2d at 228.
147. Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward An Interpretive Theory of Culture, in
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (Clifford Geertz ed., 1977).
148. At least, the court's analysis in Swanson suggests that this is the case. Swanson,
268 Neb. at 270-71, 682 N.W.2d at 231.
149. Volkmer, supra note 5, at 309.
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even if allowed her day in court, as a jury could determine that there
had been no professional negligence on Ptak's part.150 In fact, this
may be the most likely scenario. It is an extremely difficult proposi-
tion to make that Ptak was negligent in not sending some portion of
Wilma's estate her way since Swanson had no claim under Nebraska's
intestacy laws. While her reliance seems clear under the facts re-
counted in the opinion, Swanson was not even an intended beneficiary
as per the typical estate-related malpractice case. Further, the facts
of the case seem to fit the Kurtenbach test, but a jury may have little
sympathy for malpractice allegations that are leveled against an at-
torney who (1) tried to help a non-beneficiary procure a share of her
family's estate, (2) worked with the family to secure a share for her,
and (3) contacted Swanson as soon as he realized the family did not
wish to divide the estate. Thus, even if the Nebraska Supreme Court
had denied summary judgment and allowed Swanson to reach a jury,
she may not have recovered at trial.
The possibility that Swanson may not have won on the facts even
with a broader interpretation of Kurtenbach supports the argument
that the strict privity requirement could be loosened without opening
attorneys to "automatic" liability.151 Perhaps the most common justi-
fication for the privity requirement is the belief that strict privity
"greatly limits malpractice liability."'152 However, the Iowa Supreme
Court explained that its loosening of the privity requirement was
"carefully limited so as not to 'expose lawyers to a virtually unlimited
potential for liability.'" 15 3 In fact, the nature of the balancing, intent,
and Kurtenbach tests is to provide recovery for some plaintiffs, but not
to preclude or allow all plaintiffs to state a claim. The inquiry in these
cases is more fact-intensive because the courts must consider, for ex-
ample, whether the decedent evidenced some intent to devise a gift to
the third party plaintiff154 or "the moral blame attached to the defen-
dant's conduct."' 55 However, it is this focus on the facts of each indi-
vidual case that limits recovery: not all plaintiffs in a state that
150. A recent survey of estate-related malpractice cases by author Martin Begleiter
offers no help in this regard. Begleiter, supra note 1, at 287-341. The Swanson
fact pattern does not fit into any of the many categories identified, which include
cases in which the decedent's intent was not effectuated, cases involving the rule
against perpetuities, and cases in which testamentary capacity was at issue. Id.
151. Volkmer, supra note 5, at 309.
152. Begleiter, supra note 1, at 286. Begleiter identifies several other justifications for
privity, including protection of the "integrity and solemnity of the will" and the
need to protect the relationship between the attorney and decedent. The privity
requirement also purportedly "protects attorney-client confidentiality." Id. at
346.
153. Holsapple v. McGrath, 575 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Schreiner v.
Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Iowa 1987)).
154. Holsapple, 575 N.W.2d at 520.
155. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958).
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utilizes the Kurtenbach approach will be able to, for example, show
that the attorney, without a contract, agreed to provide legal advice156
or that the plaintiff relied on such advice.157 Thus, while recovery is
not patently barred for all third-party plaintiffs, nor should it be, the
plaintiffs' interactions with their defendant-attorneys must still fit a
template of facts in order to state a claim.158
Finally, as was discussed in Part I, the ABA reports that only nine
percent of malpractice cases in the late 1990s (the most recent statis-
tics available) arose from estate-related cases, and of those only 2.2%
resulted in plaintiff victories in court. 15 9 Admittedly, there has been a
0.62% increase in estate-related malpractice claims since a similar
1985 ABA study.16o However, this miniscule increase-less than one
percent of cases nationally-suggests that the nearly national abroga-
tion of strict privity has clearly not resulted in an "open season" on
wills and estates attorneys. Even if states do not approach third-party
standing in the same manner, the fact that these systems are func-
tioning in the vast majority of state courts suggests that the benefit of
giving certain third parties their day in court outweighs the concern
that abrogating privity will open the malpractice floodgates. The pre-
diction that abrogation (or weakening) of the privity requirement
would prompt open-ended malpractice liability for attorneys has not
come to pass.
D. Privity and Loss-Bearing
In addition to these more practical considerations, there are policy-
related reasons to reevaluate the strict privity requirement, including
traditional tort notions of loss-bearing. 16 1 The theoretical foundations
of tort law stress shifting loss away from the innocent party,16 2 be-
cause an important function of tort actions "is to restore plaintiffs to
the position they were in prior to the injury by awarding monetary
damages."163 This is precisely why courts may choose to impose a
156. Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977).
157. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
158. In fact, this is exactly the problem with Nebraska's current interpretation of the
Kurtenbach exception-the template of acceptable facts is so narrow that few
plaintiffs fit within it.
159. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 6, at 7.
160. Id. at 5. Changes in the number of malpractice claims by area of law from 1985
to 1999 range from an increase in claims of 7.62% for business transaction com-
mercial law to a decrease of 8.94% in real estate claims. Id.
161. KEETON, supra note 29, § 4.
162. Id. § 92, para. 1. "Tort obligations are .. .imposed by law on policy considera-
tions to avoid some kind of loss to others." Id.
163. KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 137, at 1.
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duty on one party in order to induce that party to adhere to a certain
standard of care. 16 4
Further, if an injured plaintiff-including a third-party plaintiff-
is barred from bringing an action, "the injury or property loss would
fall to the victim, his or her family members, or the taxpayers." 165 Ac-
cordingly, the California Supreme Court concluded in 1961 that the
elimination of strict privity "does not place an undue burden on the
profession, particularly when we take into consideration that a con-
trary conclusion would cause the innocent beneficiary to bear the
loss."166 The privity requirement, by sweeping together third parties
who do not have a reasonable claim with those who have foreseeably
relied on an attorney's advice or actions, precludes innocent parties
who may have suffered a loss from recovering, and thus shifts the cost
of legal malfeasance onto these innocent or at least potentially more
innocent parties.
Proponents also suggest that economic advantages arise when an
attorney's duty is limited, including "keep[ing] legal malpractice in-
surance costs under control, [and] keep[ing] the cost of legal services
to the community in check."167 However, this effect comes at an obvi-
ous secondary cost-precluding what might be wholly legitimate
claims by third parties simply because their relationship with the at-
torney did not accord with traditional notions of a formal attor-
ney-client relationship. If, as the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct indicate, attorneys should strive to "be [a] competent, prompt
and diligent"168 advocate who "zealously asserts the client's position
under the rules of the adversary system,"16 9 then protection of these
third parties as an end in itself is a valuable goal.
Finally, many states that have eliminated the privity requirement
have adopted approaches that provide warning to attorneys that some
liability may result from their actions, particularly those that empha-
size foreseeability, reliance, and attorney consent. Under these ap-
proaches, including Kurtenbach, attorneys need not fear liability to
any third party that might claim a benefit from, for example, a poorly
drafted will. Under Kurtenbach, liability is limited to situations in
which an attorney "expressly or impliedly" agrees to give advice on a
topic within his professional competence. 170 Thus, should an attorney
with knowledge and experience in will drafting provide negligent ad-
vice or service to another individual, the attorney's liability is based
164. KEETON, supra note 29, § 93, para. 6.
165. KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 137, at 2.
166. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961) (emphasis added).
167. Pinkall, supra note 25, at 1276.
168. See MODEL RULES, supra note 24, para. 4.
169. Id. para. 2.
170. Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977) (construing Anderson v.
Lundt, 206 N.W. 657 (Iowa 1925)).
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on his consenting to give the advice in the first place. That an attor-
ney has consented to give advice, or has in fact given such advice with-
out expressly consenting to do so, suggests that she had adequate
warning that liability might result. A liability structure such as the
one advocated here also better comports with the notions of personal
responsibility that underlie the doctrine of negligence, as an attorney's
liability is founded in her willing engagement to provide advice or ser-
vices to a client who has sought her help.
V. CONCLUSION
Teresa Stanton Collett observes that although "[iun many jurisdic-
tions only the 'client' has standing to sue for injuries resulting from an
attorney's negligence," many "estate planners and elder law special-
ists regularly counsel individuals who expect the lawyer to consider the
interests of others-spouses, children, parents, or other family mem-
bers."' 7 ' Although these expectations are different from those at is-
sue in Swanson, in which the attorney was not retained by the
decedent's family for estate planning purposes, Collett's observation
goes to perhaps the best justification for abrogating the privity re-
quirement-the fact that many decedents work from the assumption
that the attorney is not just working for them, but for their families.
Leota Swanson may not have had a successful claim even if Ne-
braska's strict privity requirement was eliminated. But in order to
provide Nebraskans with the opportunity to have their day in court,
the Nebraska Supreme Court should, at the very least, subject the
privity requirement to a methodical reconsideration. The potential of
an expanded Kurtenbach approach, one which includes a more gener-
ous sweep of potential malpractice plaintiffs than merely those with
pre-existing attorney-client relationships, is to provide recovery for
otherwise innocent plaintiffs who have experienced a loss due to an
attorney's negligence, while still maintaining limits on attorney liabil-
ity to third parties.
Tracy M. Mason
171. Teresa Stanton Collett, The Ethics of Intergenerational Representation, 62 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1453, 1453-54 (1994).
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